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Introduction
The ageing English population1 is likely to generate increased demand for social
care,2 which “supports people of all ages with certain physical, cognitive or
age-related conditions in carrying out personal care or domestic routines”.3 Local
authorities can seek contributions from capable individuals towards the direct costs
of social care by assessing relevant capital and income,4 which
“can give rise to heated social and political debate about the scope of the
‘Welfare State’ and the extent to which it was expected to provide free care
from the cradle to the grave.”5
The Care Act 2014 sought, inter alia, to limit the amount that one person can be
expected to contribute towards his or her lifetime care costs,6 albeit that a £72,000
cap due in April 20167 has been delayed until April 2020.8 Despite the Care Act’s
reforms, many individuals will be expected to contribute a significant sum towards
care costs once its funding provisions have fully commenced, even if such costs
are ultimately borne by their estates after death.9 While the threshold below which
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1Office for National Statistics, “Older People’s Day 2011” (London: ONS, 2011), p.1.
2See, e.g. Department of Health, Caring for our Future: Consultation on Reforming what and how People pay for
their Care and Support (Crown, September 2013), para.11.
3Commission on Funding of Care and Support, Fairer Care Funding: The Report of the Commission on Funding
of Care and Support (July 2011), p.4; cf. National Health Service Act 2006 s.1(4).
4Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/2672) (CS(CAR)R 2014).
See B. Sloan, “Adult social care and property rights” (2016) 36 O.J.L.S. (forthcoming); University of Cambridge
Faculty of LawResearch PaperNo.24/2015, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2600043
[Accessed November 2, 2015].
5Robertson v Fife Council 2001 S.C. 849; 2001 S.L.T. 708 CSIH at [3] of Lord Bonomy’s judgment. See now
Community Care and Health (Scotland) Act 2002; and, e.g. S. Main and A. Bissett-Johnson, “The Community Care
and Health (Scotland) Act 2002 and Robertson v Fife Council” (2002) 34 S.L.T. 279.
6Care Act 2014 (CA 2014) s.15; see, generally, N. Hopkins and E. Laurie, “Social citizenship, housing wealth and
the cost of social care: is the Care Act 2014 ‘fair’?” (2015) 78 M.L.R. 112.
7Department of Health, The Care Act 2014: Consultation on Draft Regulations and Guidance to Implement the
Cap on Care Costs and Policy Proposals for a New Appeals System for Care and Support (Crown, February 2015).
8Department of Health, “Letter from Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP: Delay in the Implementation of the Cap on Care
Costs” (July 17, 2015), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/delay-in-the-implementation-of-the
-cap-on-care-costs [Accessed November 2, 2015].
9CA 2014 s.34.
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means-tested help is provided was to increase to £118,000 from £23,250 in April
2016,10 there were a number of significant limitations on the cap’s effect even
before the delay was announced.11
This continuing potential liability is likely to lead to attempts to shield assets,
including via declarations of trust, from local authorities in order to provide for
dependants and others (including informal carers)12 who would have a legitimate
claim to the care recipient’s estate.13 This article’s aim is to evaluate the Care Act
2014’s anti-avoidance provisions, particularly whether the Act achieves an adequate
balance between ensuring that the costs of necessary care are equitably distributed
and protecting the property-related interests of care recipients and those who would
otherwise be the beneficial recipients of their assets. It includes an analysis of
those provisions in light of similar mechanisms in other areas of the law applicable
to individuals in a familial context.14
Whatever the inherent difficulties in a doctrinal legal scholar’s questioning the
structure and funding model of a social care system,15 this article will argue that
the anti-avoidance provisions in the Care Act 2014 are very broadly drawn, and
that the Act over-relies on discretion and statutory guidance to ensure that local
authorities exercise anti-avoidance powers in a nuanced manner. It demonstrates
that incorporating care fee avoidance into financial planning risks being both
ineffectual and expensive.
Anti-avoidance and the Care Act 2014
The Government’s statutory guidance on the Care Act 2014 states that “[p]eople
with care and support needs are free to spend their income and assets as they see
fit, including making gifts to friends and family”, which it acknowledges “is
important for promoting their wellbeing and enabling them to live fulfilling and
independent lives”.16 It is also anxious that “[p]eople should be treated with dignity
and respect and be able to spend the money they have saved as they wish”, on the
basis that “it is their money after all”.17
The guidance then counters such notions, however, by stating that “it is also
important that people pay their fair contribution towards their care and support
costs”,18which is “key to the overall affordability of the care and support system”.19
It emphasises the need to “ensure that people are not rewarded for trying to avoid
paying their assessed contribution”.20 This demonstrates the fundamental tension
that the Act’s funding (including anti-avoidance) provisions inevitably reflect.
Whatever one’s view of the Act’s model, it is also true that (to borrow Sawyer and
10Department of Health, The Care Act 2014 (2015), para.9.7. The figure was to be £27,000 when a person’s home
was not included.
11 See, further, e.g. Sloan, “Adult social care and property rights” (2016) 36 O.J.L.S. (forthcoming).
12B. Sloan, Informal Carers and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013).
13A.R. Barr, “Bridging the care gap: Robertson v Fife Council and paying for residential care” (2003) 7 Edin. L.R.
118, 123 (footnote omitted).
14 See also, e.g. A. Keay, “Transactions defrauding creditors: the problem of purpose under section 423 of the
Insolvency Act” [2003] 67 Conv. 272.
15Cf. Sloan, “Adult social care and property rights” (2016) 36 O.J.L.S. (forthcoming).
16Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance: Issued under the Care Act 2014 (Crown, June
2014) para.8.27.
17Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.4.
18Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), para.8.27.
19Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.4.
20Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.4.
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Spero’s phrase from the context of inheritance tax) the declaring of trusts in an
attempt to avoid care fees “should not be allowed to become a fetish”.21Awould-be
settlor will need to ensure that he or she has enough to live on at least unless and
until he or she requires care, and a sufficiently wealthy individual is likely to want
to make “top-up” payments to secure a high standard of accommodation when the
need arises.22
While this article focuses on the ability to assess a care recipient as still
possessing “notional” property of which he or she has in fact deprived himself or
herself,23 and the power to claim the value of at least part of the property from a
third party recipient,24 a care recipient’s qualifying relative could move into the
recipient’s home immediately before that recipient enters residential care in order
to benefit from the relevant “disregard”,25 and local authorities could find
mechanisms outside the Act to counter anti-avoidance.26
Notional capital and income
Notional capital and income are important alternatives to undertaking the potentially
difficult process of claiming the value of property of which a care recipient has
disposed from a third party under s.70 of the Care Act 2014, particularly if (for
example) a device such as a discretionary trust has been used. The guidance regards
it as a “first step” for a local authority to use the notional property provisions.27 It
is highly significant that, whatever the complexity of the avoiding trust, the trust
beneficiaries’ status or the ultimate fate of the trust’s property, the notional property
provisions in principle allow the effect of the trust to be nullified on the basis that
at least some of the beneficial interest has left the care recipient.
Under the pre-Care Act 2014 law, notional capital was dealt with under reg.25
of the National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Regulations 1992, which
was judicially confirmed to be an “anti-avoidance provision”.28 It apparently remains
in force as of September 2015, presumably for transitional reasons. By virtue of
reg.25,
“A [care home] resident may be treated as possessing actual capital of which
he has deprived himself for the purpose of decreasing the amount that he may
be liable to pay for his accommodation.”29
21C. Sawyer and M. Spero, Succession, Wills and Probate, 3rd edn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p.289.
22 See, e.g. Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex A.
23CS(CAR)R 2014 regs 22 and 17; Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex
E paras [19]–[20].
24CA 2014 s.70. A local authority could conduct an investigation, which would be regulated by the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000: Department of Health,Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.17.
25CS(CAR)R 2014 Sch.2 para.4; R. (on the application of Walford) v Worcestershire CC [2015] EWCA Civ 22;
[2015] B.L.G.R. 133 at [24] fn.2, per Underhill LJ. Cf. Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance
(2014), Annex E para.10. While couples could structure wills such that a surviving possible care recipient never
receives certain property, this might be caught e,g. by CS(CAR)R 2014 regs 17(2) and 22(2).
26See, e.g. Insolvency Act 1986 s.423, discussed in T. Spencer-Lane,Care Act Manual (London: Sweet &Maxwell,
2014), para.1-689 and successfully invoked in Derbyshire CC v Akrill [2005] EWCA Civ 308; (2005) 8 C.C.L. Rep.
173.
27Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.19.
28Cunningham v East Lothian Council [2011] CSOH 185; 2011 G.W.D. 39-792 at [19] (Lord Pentland).
29National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/2977) (NA(AR)R 1992) reg.25(1).
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There are exceptions relating to personal injury compensation trusts and payments,30
and a reduction for any amount that is paid towards care by the resident.31 There
is specific reference to notional capital that would be treated as such for an income
support claimant,32 with some finessing.33 The regulation confirms that
“Where a resident is treated as possessing notional [capital under its
provisions] the foregoing provisions of this Part shall apply for the purposes
of calculating its amount as if it were actual capital which he does possess.”34
There are equivalent provisions for notional income.35
In Derbyshire CC v Akrill Latham LJ held that reg.25 inter alia
“make it clear that, insofar as [a care recipient] had or could be treated as
having the value of … [a residential] property [that had been the subject of
a deed of gift to his son and daughter], then that could and should… be taken
into account [in the local authority’s financial assessment].”36
On the facts, the local authority had initially purported not to invoke reg.25
(apparently due to an error on the deed’s date) but then changed its mind. The
Court of Appeal remitted the case for a re-evaluation of that change of mind in
the particular public law context. The “subjective purpose” of the care recipient
was held to be the relevant factor under the old regulations in R. (on the application
of Beeson) v Dorset CC.37
Under the Care Act 2014 and its Care and Support (Charging and Assessment
of Resources) Regulations 2014, a person “is to be”38 assessed on the basis of his
or her actual and notional capital, including, inter alia,
“capital of which the adult has deprived themselves for the purpose of
decreasing the amount that they may be liable to pay towards the cost of
meeting their needs for care and support.”
There is a cross-reference (as in the 1992 Regulations) to income support.39 The
value of notional capital is reduced by the difference between the weekly amount
the person pays towards care and the amount he or she would pay if the notional
capital did not apply.40 Notional income is treated similarly to notional capital,41
although there are exceptions.42 The consequence of being assessed as having
relevant notional property could include that a person has to use property that
formally should be subject to a disregard to fund care in order to compensate for
the property that he or she is regarded as beneficially owning, but in fact does not;
30NA(AR)R 1992 reg.25(1)(a), (c).
31NA(AR)R 1992 regs 25(1)(b) and 26.
32NA(AR)R 1992 reg.25(2).
33NA(AR)R 1992 reg.25(3).
34NA(AR)R 1992 reg.25(5).
35NA(AR)R 1992 reg.17.
36Derbyshire CC v Akrill [2005] EWCA Civ 308; (2005) 8 C.C.L. Rep. 173 at [23].
37R. (on the application of Beeson) v Dorset CC [2002] EWCA Civ 1812; [2003] H.R.L.R. 11 at [13] (Laws LJ
giving the judgment of the Court).
38CS(CAR)R 2014 reg.22(1).
39CS(CAR)R 2014 reg.22; Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex B paras
28–36.
40CS(CAR)R 2014 reg.23.
41CS(CAR)R 2014 reg.17; Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex C paras
32–35.
42Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex C para.36.
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or to continue paying for care due to notional capital even if his or her actual capital
alone places him or her below the lower capital limit.
The notional property provisions will be affected by the bringing into line of
provisions on residential and non-residential care by the Act, i.e. when local
authorities will have a discretion as regards charging in both contexts,43 rather than
an obligation to charge for residential care44 and a discretion to charge for
non-residential care.45 Previously, the obligation in principle to charge for residential
care and the ability to assess notional capital was particularly harsh, and a local
authority could mitigate the effect of the notional property provisions by deciding
not to charge for residential care in the first place under the 2014 Regulations.
Conversely, it is significant that non-residential care was not within the ambit of
the old reg.25, and indeed the pre-Care Act 2014 guidance for such care does not
apparently cover anti-avoidance,46 whereas both types of care are included within
the new Regulations.
It is arguable that the ability to take into account notional property was a matter
of some discretion under the 1992 Regulations (signalled by the phrase “may be”),
whereas the phrase “is to be” in the newRegulations implies an obligation, although
Latham LJ’s phrasing of “could and should” (emphasis added) suggests that he
regarded reg.25 as imposing an obligation. In any case, the law in this respect has
not apparently been subjected to a significant change by the 2014 Act and its
secondary legislation, beyond the consistency applied to residential and
non-residential care.
Lord Bonomy noted in Fife Council v Robertson that a deprivation of assets for
the purposes of “notional capital” was “a much wider concept than that of
transferring assets to some other person or persons”,47 which will be considered
in the next sub-section of this article. The fact that the regulations affecting notional
capital do not encompass claims against third parties was, in his view, “consistent
with the much wider ambit of the regulations”.48 It is significant, for example, that
neither regs 17 or 25 of the 1992 Regulations nor regs 17 or 22 of the 2014
Regulations appear to be subject to a formal time limit as regards when a disposition
of (ultimately) notional property took place. On Lord Philip’s analysis in Yule v
South Lanarkshire Council (No.1),
“accordingly, so long as the deprivation was made for the purpose of
decreasing the amount that the resident might be liable to pay, he may [under
reg.25] be treated as possessing the capital disposed of, whenever the disposal
took place.”49
43Department of Health, Impact Assessment: The Care Act 2014 (2014) IA No.6107, para.1.116.
44National Assistance Act 1948 s.22; CS(CAR)R 2014 reg.12(1).
45Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983 (HSSSSAA 1983), Pt VII; CS(CAR)R
2014 reg.12(2).
46Department of Health, Fairer Charging Policies for Home Care and other Non-Residential Social Services
(Crown, June 2013); see also Local Authority Circular LAC(2001)32, but cf. Department of Health, Charging for
Residential Accommodation Guide (CRAG): In support of The National Assistance (Assessment of Resources)
Regulations 1992 (S.I. 1992/2977) (Crown, 2014).
47Robertson v Fife Council 2001 S.C. 849; 2001 S.L.T. 708 at [11] of Lord Bonomy’s judgment. It should be
noted that the substantive decision was overturned ([2002] UKHL 35; 2002 S.C. (H.L.) 145) on the basis that the
local authority in question erred in taking into account the care recipient’s capital when assessing her needs.
48Robertson v Fife Council 2001 S.C. 849; 2001 S.L.T. 708 at [11] of Lord Bonomy’s judgment.
49Yule v South Lanarkshire Council (No.1)1998 S.L.T. 490; (1997–98) 1 C.C.L. Rep. 571 CSOH at 493; see also,
e.g. Robertson v Fife Council 2001 S.C. 849; 2001 S.L.T. 708 at [24] (Lord President (Roger)).
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This in principle means that a person who deprives himself or herself of property
in order (and not necessarily solely in order) to avoid care fees but long before the
care is actually required or provided is within the scope of the notional property
rules. It is particularly significant that, unlike a claim against a third party, a local
authority’s decision to include a particular piece of notional property would usually
be scrutinised by a court only if proceedings are brought by the care recipient
himself or herself.
It will be seen, however, that the notional property and recovery from third
parties provisions may be closer to each other under the Care Act 2014 because
of the doubt over whether s.70 is subject to a substantive time limit. In any case,
the 2014 Regulations on notional property are very broad, and it will become clear
that the social care funding system effectively relies on discretion and statutory
guidance to ensure that they are not applied too harshly.
Claims against third parties
Under s.70 of the Care Act 2014, certain below-market-value “transfers” can give
rise to a debt between the third party transferee and the relevant local authority,
which can be recovered under s.69. Section 70 is expressed to apply where “an
adult’s needs have been or are being met by a local authority under sections 18 to
20”.50 In such circumstances, the local authority’s recovery powers are exercisable
where “the adult has transferred an asset to another person” (the “transferee”),51
“the transfer was undertaken with the intention of avoiding charges for having the
adult’s needs met”,52 and either there was no consideration for the transfer or “the
consideration for the transfer was less than the value of the asset”.53 An “asset” is
“anything which may be taken into account for the purposes of a financial
assessment”,54 and its “value” (where it is not cash) is “the amount which would
have been realised if it had been sold on the open market by a willing seller at the
time of the transfer”, with some allowances.55
Where the above requirements are met, s.70(2) makes the transferee “liable to
pay to the local authority an amount equal to the difference” between what it would
have charged the adult (had it not been for the transfer) and what it did charge the
adult.56 The liability is expressed not to include “an amount which exceeds the
benefit accruing to the transferee from the transfer”,57 and is “in proportion to the
benefit accruing to [each] transferee” where there is more than one.58 Section 70
leaves open the possibility that “[r]egulations may specify cases or circumstances
in which liability under subsection (2) does not arise”,59 butHalsbury’s Annotations
confirm that no such regulations have been made.
The documentation relating to the Draft Care and Support Bill stated that what
is now s.70 “replaces section 21 of the Health and Social Services and Social
50CA 2014 s.70(1).
51CA 2014 s.70(1)(a).
52CA 2014 s.70(1)(b).
53CA 2014 s.70(1)(c).
54CA 2014 s.70(5).
55CA 2014 s.70(6).
56CA 2014 s.70(2).
57CA 2014 s.70(3).
58CA 2014 s.70(4).
59CA 2014 s.70(7); cf. HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(3A).
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Security Adjudications Act 1983”.60 The Care Act’s impact assessment did not
“expect the new powers for debt recovery to change individuals’ behaviour, because
they replicate the current powers and definition of what is and is not a debt”.61
Section 21 of the 1983 Act (again, still apparently in force as of September 2015,
presumably for transitional reasons), however, applies only to residential
accommodation (as with the notional property provisions). This again potentially
brings more types of care within the scope of anti-avoidance provisions, although
it has been seen that charging for both residential and non-residential care in the
first place will ultimately be subject to discretion.
Specifically, s.21 applies to a person who “avails himself of Part III
accommodation”.62 Where such a person “knowingly and with the intention of
avoiding charges for the accommodation”,63 “has transferred any [relevant] asset
… to some other person or persons not more than six months before the date on
which he begins to reside in such accommodation”,64 or did so “while residing in
the accommodation”,65 and the consideration was either non-existent66 or less than
the value of the asset, “the person or persons to whom the asset is transferred …
shall be liable to pay to the local authority … the difference between the amount
assessed as due to be paid for the accommodation … and the amount which the
local authority receive from him.”67 Consistently with the Care Act 2014, the s.21
liability applies in respect of “cash and any other asset which falls to be taken into
account for the purpose of assessing” the accommodated person’s ability to pay
for it,68 to the extent of the benefit received by the transferee69 and in proportion
to that benefit for each of multiple transferees.70 The value of a relevant asset other
than cash is similarly “the amount … which would have been realised for it if it
had been sold on the open market by a willing seller at the time of the transfer”,71
again with some allowances.72
There are very clear similarities between s.21 of the 1983 Act and s.70 of the
2014 Act, though there are significant questions of timing. It is unclear whether
the transfer must happen while “an adult’s needs have been or are being met by a
local authority” under s.70, even though those are the criteria for the section’s
applicability. The reference to the transfer is in the past tense, and no particular
period is specified during which it must have taken place. The phrasing in s.21 of
the 1983 Act is both clearer and less onerous in specifying that the relevant transfer
must take place either while the transferee is being accommodated or within a
period of six months beforehand, even though transferred property could still be
treated as notional capital if it fell outside that limit.
60HM Government, Draft Care and Support Bill (TSO, 2012), Cm.8386, para.75; see also Local Government
Association, “Care Act Clause Analysis” (2015), available at http://www.local.gov.uk/care-support-reform/-/journal
_content/56/10180/5761381/ARTICLE [Accessed November 2, 2015].
61Department of Health, Impact Assessment: The Care Act 2014 (2014), para.1.133.
62HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(1)(a); see further, HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(8); NAA, s.21–26.
63HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(1)(b).
64HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(1)(b)(i).
65HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(1)(b)(ii). Where a person leaves and then returns to accommodation, the six-month period
is treated as referring to that before the return: s.21(3).
66HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(1)(c)(i).
67HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(1).
68HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(2).
69HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(5).
70HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(4).
71HSSSSAA 1983 s 21(6).
72HSSSSAA 1983 s.21(7).
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The omission of a time limit from s.70 might be remedied by the fact that the
ability to recover the debt per se, contained in s.69, is subject to a prima facie limit
of six years,73 although a difficulty remains. Section 69’s limit relates to “the date
the sum becomes due”.74 A sum transferred to avoid care charges, however, surely
does not become a debt “due” to the local authority until it has conducted relevant
needs and financial assessments and decided to charge. If no care was ever required,
and no assessments carried out, the sum would never be “due”.
If the author’s interpretation is correct, s.70 imposes no time limit between the
date of the transfer and the date of the financial assessment. As with the notional
property provisions, in principle s.70 encompasses transfers made for the purposes
of avoiding care charges years before care was provided and before it was clear
that such care would be needed. It may be arguable that it is impossible to have
an “intention of avoiding charges for having … needs met”75 unless the adult
concerned knows or strongly suspects that his or her needs will have to be met
under the Care Act 2014. This is not, however, consistent with Lord Phillip’s
reference to “the purpose of decreasing the amount that the residentmight be liable
to pay” when describing the relevant intention under the 1992 Regulations,76 even
if it is (as will be seen in the next sub-section) consistent with the statutory
guidance.
It is now necessary to consider the recovery of the debt once established. The
Draft Care and Support Bill documentation asserted that the provisions in what
became s.69 “consolidate various powers”.77 Section 22 of the 1983Act nevertheless
familiarly applied only to residential care and allowed the local authority to create
a charge over land in which a person who “fails to pay any sum assessed as due
to be paid by him for the accommodation”78 has a beneficial interest. The statutory
guidance claims that s.69 “provides equal protection to both the local authority
and the person”, in contrast to the “unilateral” powers under the 1983 Act that did
not provide the debtor with an alternative means of payment.79
Section 69 expressly provides that “[a]ny sum due to a local authority under
[Part 1 of the Act] is recoverable by the authority as a debt due to it”,80 and the
cost of (at least attempting) to recover the debt can be added to it.81 This is set out
without regard to whether the relevant care is residential. The local authority is
required to offer a Deferred Payment Agreement (DPA) where possible,82 and can
apply to court to enforce a debt only where a DPA is not possible or is refused by
the debtor. The Care Act 2014 has, however, doubled the length of time (from
three to six years) in which a debt can be recovered.83 Provided proceedings have
been issued within six years, the debt can still be recovered, but otherwise it must
73CA 2014 s.69(3).
74CA 2014 s.69(3).
75CA 2014 s.70(1)(b).
76Yule v South Lanarkshire Council (No.1) 1998 S.L.T. 490; (1997–98) 1 C.C.L. Rep. 571 at 493 (emphasis added);
see also, e.g. Robertson v Fife Council 2001 S.C. 849; 2001 S.L.T. 708 at [24] (Lord President (Roger)).
77H.M. Government,Draft Care and Support Bill (2012) para.74; see National Assistance Act 1948 s.45; CA 2014
s.69(4); and Spencer-Lane, Care Act Manual (2014), para.1-685 on misrepresentation-related debts.
78HSSSSAA 1983 s.22(1)(a).
79Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex D para.2.
80CA 2014 s.69(1).
81CA 2014 s.69(5).
82CA 2014 s.69(2).
83CA 2014 s.69(3).
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be written off.84 While there is a specific power for the Secretary of State to make
regulations regarding the time a sum is due, when it is not recoverable and the
charging of interest,85 as with s.70,Halsbury’s Annotations claim that no regulations
have been made under s.69.
The guidance emphasises the importance of considering the vulnerabilities of
the population sub-set with which local authorities are dealing when devising
internal debt enforcement policies. There is an emphasis on discussion, agreement,
reasonable action and consideration of the Act’s overall wellbeing duty.86 It should
be remembered, however, that the defendant in cases involving s.70 will be a third
party and not the relevant care recipient.
It seems that the local authority therefore has a choice between assessing the
adult’s capital as though he or she still had the beneficial interest in the alienated
asset, or pursuing the transferee for the value of the asset. If it decides to charge
the adult in full after assessing him or her on the basis of notional capital, the
“difference” for the purposes of s.70(2) would be zero, and no claim would be
feasible. This is the correct approach, since otherwise the local authority would
surely be unjustly enriched.
We have seen that notional property is considered the first resort where
deprivation has occurred, and it may seem fairer for a knowing care recipient to
be more directly penalised for an avoiding transaction than a third party recipient
who may not have known of the purpose behind it. It should be remembered,
however, that the care recipient will be inherently vulnerable at the time of a
decision to charge, and that a third party at risk of a s.70 claim will by definition
not have given full consideration for the property concerned. In any case, the holder
of a beneficial interest in relevant property may voluntarily surrender his or her
interest on learning that it has been treated as notional capital in respect of the
transferor’s assessment, although this will depend upon the personal relationship
between the transferor and the beneficiary at the time.
This article has put forward a bleak interpretation of s.70 from the perspective
of those who might be tempted to make dispositions to alleviate liability to pay
for care and the putative beneficiaries of those dispositions, even well in advance
of care needs arising. Such beneficiaries may be at a particular disadvantage
compared to those subject to the old s.21, and it is noteworthy that s.70 can
effectively impose strict receipt-based personal liability.87 The next sub-section,
however, shows that the statutory guidance purports to mitigate the harshness of
the interpretation put forward by the author.
Statutory guidance on “deprivation of assets”
Deprivation of assets is addressed in Annex E of the Care Act 2014’s guidance,
covering both assessment of notional capital/income (to some extent)88 and claims
against third party recipients, but apparently applying the same principles to the
twomechanisms. The deprivation guidance is similar to that immediately pre-dating
84Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex D para.11.
85CA 2014 s.69(6).
86CA 2014 s.1; Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex D para.10.
87Cf. e.g. G. Virgo and P.S. Davies, Equity and Trusts: Text, Cases andMaterials (Oxford: OUP, 2013), pp.907–918.
88Cf. e.g. Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annexes B and C.
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the Care Act 2014,89 albeit more detailed. The new guidance emphasises that local
authorities “should treat this issue with sensitivity and care”,90 and that “deprivation
should not be automatically assumed”, since “there may be valid reasons why
someone no longer has an asset”.91 Moreover,
“the overall principle should be that when a person has tried to deprive
themselves of assets, this should not affect the amount of local authority
support they receive.”92
The guidance defines “deprivation” as “where a person has intentionally deprived
or decreased their overall assets in order to reduce the amount they are charged
towards their care”,93 meaning that “they must have known that they needed care
and support and have reduced their assets in order to reduce the contribution they
are asked to make towards the cost of [it]”,94 even though (as demonstrated in the
last sub-section) this is not necessarily obvious from the legislation itself.
Somewhat less sympathetically, the guidance claims (without reference to
specific authority) that it is for the relevant adult to prove that he or she no longer
has the asset or income in question.95 Regarding the explanation for a transaction,
in Yule v South Lanarkshire Council (No.2) it was at least held that
“the local authority … must have material before it from which it can be
reasonably inferred that the deprivation … took place deliberately and with
a purpose of the nature specified.”96
The guidance is generally quite nuanced, and emphasises the importance of whether
the asset in question would have been included in a financial assessment in the
first place.97 Relevant considerations specified are: “[w]hether avoiding the care
and support charge was a significant motivation”; “[t]he timing of the disposal of
the asset”; and in particular whether “the person ha[d] a reasonable expectation
of needing to contribute to the cost of their eligible care needs”.98 It is specifically
reiterated to be
“unreasonable to decide that a person had disposed of an asset in order to
reduce the level of charges for their care and support … if at the time… they
were fit and healthy and could not have foreseen the need for care and
support.”99
There are therefore respects in which the guidance appears more sensitive to the
difficulties faced by a care recipient than the primary and secondary legislation
itself, and this is welcome. It is interesting that while the guidance (like the
regulations) implies an obligation as to consideration of notional property in the
89Department of Health,Charging for Residential Accommodation Guide (2014), paras 6.055–6.074, 8.061–8.085.
90Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.3.
91Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.3.
92Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.5. See, e.g. Robertson v Fife
CC [2002] UKHL 35; 2002 S.C. (H.L.) 145.
93Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.6.
94Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.6.
95Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E paras 8, 14.
96 Yule v South Lanarkshire Council (No.2) 2001 S.C. 203; 2000 S.L.T. 1249 CSIH at [28] (Lord Philip).
97Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), p.449; CS(CAR)R 2014 Sch.2 para.13.
98Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.[11].
99Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.[12].
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context of asset deprivation,100 the decision-making process outlined by the guidance
might produce a somewhat discretionary approach.
The Act expressly imposes an obligation on local authorities to
“act under the general guidance of the Secretary of State in the exercise of
functions given to it by [the relevant] Part [of the Act] or… regulations under
[it].”101
According to the Act’s Explanatory Notes, that provision was intended to have
the “same legal effect” as s.7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970,102
interpreted as requiring local authorities
“to follow the path charted by the … guidance, with liberty to deviate from
it where the local authority judges on admissible grounds that there is good
reason to do so, but without freedom to take a substantially different course.”103
It has been said that “the guidance does not have the binding effect of secondary
legislation and a local authority is free to depart from it, even ‘substantially’”,
albeit that “it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which mere disagreement
with the guidance could amount to a cogent reason for departing from it”.104
In any case, it is arguably detrimental to the rule of law and the individual’s
legitimate interest in knowing precisely what he or she may or may not do with
his or her own property for the Care Act 2014’s deprivation guidance (which can
be reissued without much difficulty) and local authority discretion to be apparently
crucial. The author may be unduly pessimistic in his reading of the relevant
provisions. It is nevertheless significant that even the guidance does not specify a
time limit for avoiding dispositions, and the risk is that a very well-organised
individual might waste money in a failed attempt to avoid hypothetical care charges.
Anti-avoidance in other areas
This section further evaluates the Care Act 2014’s anti-avoidance provisions by
comparing them to those found in other areas of the law.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
The broad equivalent to s.70 of the Care Act 2014 in the Matrimonial Causes Act
1973 is s.37. Where it is satisfied that a party to financial relief proceedings
(generally relating to divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership)105 is about to
“make any disposition or to transfer out of the jurisdiction or otherwise deal with
any property”,106 or “made a reviewable disposition”,107 “with the intention of
defeating the claim for financial relief”, the court can inter alia restrain the intended
100Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2014), Annex E para.[8]; cf. Department of
Health, Charging for Residential Accommodation Guidance (2014), para.[6.062].
101CA 2014 s.78(1).
102Explanatory Notes to the Care Act 2014, para.[472].
103R. v Islington LBC Ex p. Rixon [1997] E.L.R. 66; (1997–98) 1 C.C.L. Rep. 119 QBD at 71, per Sedley J.
104R. (on the application of X) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2013] EWHC 480 (Admin); [2013] 3 All E.R. 157 at [35],
per Males J; affirmed on appeal by Maurice Kay LJ: [2013] EWCA Civ 904; [2013] 4 All E.R. 237 at [28].
105 See Civil Partnership Act 2004 Sch.5 paras 74–75.
106Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) s.37(2)(a).
107MCA 1973 s.37(2)(b). Section 37(2)(c) makes specific provision for cases where a financial order has been
made.
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disposition108 or set it aside.109 A “disposition” is expressed not to “include any
provision contained in a will or codicil”, but otherwise “includes any conveyance,
assurance or gift of property of any description”.110 It is “reviewable”
“unless it was made for valuable consideration (other than marriage) to a
person who, at the time …, acted in relation to it in good faith and without
notice of any intention on the part of the other party to defeat the applicant’s
claim.”111
Where the relevant disposition or dealing has not yet occurred or occurred less
than three years before the s.37 application, an intention to defeat the claim is
presumed if the court is satisfied that it would have, or has had, that consequence.112
This presumption seems harsher than the position under the Care Act 2014,
even if a care recipient can be prejudiced by a presumption that he or she still has
an asset and at least the notional property provisions will often be applied without
court supervision. On the other hand, it is notable that the 1973 Act is more
generous to the transferee in requiring notice (interpreted as including constructive
notice)113 as compared to the 2014 Act, and that the exercise of the s.37 power (as
distinct from the decision to enforce a debt inevitably created by the 2014 Act) is
discretionary.
Under the 1973 Act, consistently with the Care Act 2014, there are two principal
mechanisms as regards anti-avoidance.114 Where the s.37 power is not used, the
court can in principle take the disposition into account when dividing the assets
as relevant conduct under s.25(2)(g) of the Act.115 In Le Foe v Le Foe, however,
Mostyn QC did not consider it “fair” for the full consequence of the husband’s
fraudulent mortgaging of the matrimonial home to be imposed upon him.116 The
extent of the judicial discretion under s.25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
might make anti-avoidance outside s.37 even more uncertain than under the Care
Act 2014.
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975
The 1975 Act allows a court to make provision out of a deceased person’s estate
where any will and/or the intestacy rules do not make “reasonable financial
provision” for a number of categories of applicant.117 The anti-avoidance provisions
are ss.10 and 11, which Borkowski considers “radical”.118
Under s.10, where a court is satisfied that “less than six years before the date
of … death of the deceased, the deceased with the intention of defeating an
application for financial provision under this Act made a disposition”,119 that
108MCA 1973 s.37(2)(a).
109MCA 1973 s.37(2)(b), (c).
110MCA 1973 s.37(6).
111MCA 1973 s.37(4).
112MCA 1973 s.37(5).
113Kemmis v Kemmis (Welland intervening) [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1307; [1988] 2 F.L.R. 223 CA (Civ Div).
114 See also Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503; [2007] 1 F.L.R. 1246 on the limited extent to which an
interest under a discretionary trust can be treated as a relevant resource of a party to ancillary relief proceedings.
115 See, e.g. US v SR [2014] EWHC 175 (Fam) at [63], per Judge Roberts QC.
116 Le Foe v Le Foe [2001] 2 F.L.R. 970; [2002] 1 F.C.R. 107 Fam. Div. at [88].
117 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (I(PFD)A 1975) s.1.
118A. Borkowski, Textbook on Succession, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2002), p.303.
119 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(2)(a).
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“valuable consideration for that disposition was not given by” anyone,120 and that
exercising its powers would “facilitate the making of financial provision for the
applicant”,121 it may order the donee to supply money or other property for the
purposes of making such provision,122 provided that an amount of money or property
specified in the order does not exceed the value received.123 Where an order has
been made under s.10, the donee or an applicant for financial provision may seek
a similar order in respect of other dispositions.124When deciding whether to exercise
its s.10 power, the court is instructed to consider
“the circumstances in which any disposition was made and any valuable
consideration which was given therefor, the relationship, if any, of the donee
to the deceased, the conduct and financial resources of the donee and all the
other circumstances of the case.”125
A disposition covered by s.10 is expressed to exclude one in a will, a nomination
according to an enactment,126 a donatio mortis causa127 or in exercise of a special
power of appointment.128 Conversely, it is expressed otherwise to include “any
payment of money … and any conveyance, assurance, appointment or gift of
property of any description”.129 There is clearly a lot of discretion involved in s.10
applications, but at least there is a limitation in scope caused by the six-year time
limit as compared to both the 2014 and 1973 Acts.130
Under s.11 of the 1975 Act, where the court is satisfied that “with the intention
of defeating an application for financial provision”131 the deceased at any time
before death (unlike s.10) made “a contract by which he agreed to leave by his
will a sum of money or other property or… agreed that…money or other property
would be paid or transferred to any person out of his estate”,132 that “when the
contract was made full valuable consideration … was not given or promised” by
anyone and that exercising its powers would facilitate a claim,133 the court may
make a range of orders.134 The court may exercise its power only to the extent that
the relevant transfer exceeds any consideration given,135 and the relevant factors
are otherwise comparable to those under s.10.136 The ability to enforce or recover
damages or other relief in respect of the contract survives only to the extent that
they are consistent with the terms of the order.137
A relevant “intention” for the purposes of ss.10 and 11 is present if “the court
is of the opinion that, on a balance of probabilities, the intention of the deceased
120 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(2)(b).
121 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(2)(c).
122 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(2).
123 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(3)–(4).
124 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(5).
125 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(6).
126 I(PFD)A 1975 s.8(1).
127 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(7)(a).
128 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(7)(b).
129 I(PFD)A 1975 s.10(7).
130See, e.g. AC v DC [2012] EWHC 2032 (Fam); [2013] 2 F.L.R. 1483 for a comparison between s.10 of the 1975
Act and s.37 of the 1973 Act.
131 I(PFD)A 1975 s.11(2)(b).
132 I(PFD)A 1975 s.11(2)(a).
133 I(PFD)A 1975 s.11(2)(c).
134 I(PFD)A 1975 s.11(2).
135 I(PFD)A 1975 s.11(3).
136 I(PFD)A 1975 s 11(4).
137 I(PFD)A 1975 s.11(5).
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(though not necessarily his sole intention) in making the disposition or contract”
was to prevent or reduce provisionmade under the Act.138 The intention is presumed
to be present for the purposes of s.11 if no valuable consideration was given or
promised.139
Aswith s.37 of the 1973 Act, the presumption of intention appears more onerous
than the anti-avoidance position under the Care Act 2014, and it is significant that
(like the Care Act but unlike s.10 of the 1975 Act), there is no time limit for
conclusion of contracts falling foul of s.11 of the 1975 Act. It should be borne in
mind, however, that a contract falling within s.11 will not take effect until death,
and (unlike dispositions covered by both the 2014 Act and s.10) the transferor will
have the benefit of the property in question until that point.140
Inheritance Tax Act 1984
Inheritance tax, governed by the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 and applied to estates
following death,141 is potentially a more useful comparator for anti-avoidance under
the Care Act 2014. Unlike the 1973 or 1975 Acts, inheritance tax is a liability
owed to the state, as with liability to pay for social care. It is nevertheless true that
paying for care confers some direct benefit on a particular individual, whereas
inheritance tax in principle benefits only society as a whole. Both social care costs
and inheritance tax are likely to be a concern for older people who engage in
financial planning, although it is claimed that only around half of social care
expenditure occurs in respect of those over 65.142
It should be noted that many estates are exempt from inheritance tax,143 and that
specific exemptions are granted to spouses and civil partners and the beneficiaries
of their estates.144 It is possible, however, for people to avoid the tax where it would
in general otherwise be due (at 40 per cent over £325,000) through various inter
vivos gifts,145 subject to the general anti-abuse rule in the Finance Act 2013.146 It
has in fact been claimed that the current system of inheritance tax “encourages the
wealthy to give property away” during their lives.147 For example, the 1984 Act
actively provides that a transfer of value “made seven years or more before the
death of the transferor” can be exempt from inheritance tax altogether,148 with
“taper relief” available if the donor dies before that,149 even if that tax avoidance
is the very reason for the transfer. People can also make additional small gifts of
certain maximum amounts during their lifetimes without those gifts later being
138 I(PFD)A 1975 s.12(1).
139 I(PFD)A 1975 s.12(2).
140 See, e.g. Borkowski, Textbook on Succession (2002), p.306 for discussion.
141 See, e.g. Sawyer and Spero, Succession, Wills and Probate (2015), Ch.14 for a general discussion of tax and
tax planning in the context of succession law.
142King’s Fund, A New Settlement for Health and Social Care: Final Report (2014), p.4
143 See now HM Revenue and Customs, “Inheritance Tax: main residence nil-rate band and the existing nil-rate
band” (July 8, 2015), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/inheritance-tax-main-residence-nil
-rate-band-and-the-existing-nil-rate-band/inheritance-tax-main-residence-nil-rate-band-and-the-existing-nil-rate
-band [Accessed November 2, 2015].
144 Sawyer and Spero, Succession, Wills and Probate (2015), §14.20.
145 Inheritance Tax Act 1984 s.10; inheritance tax applies to most lifetime trusts: see Sawyer and Spero, Succession,
Wills and Probate (2015), §14.8.
146 Finance Act 2013 Pt.5.
147 Sawyer and Spero, Succession, Wills and Probate (2015), p.286.
148 Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (IHTA 1984) s.3A(4).
149 IHTA 1984 s.7(4).
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subject to inheritance tax in certain circumstances.150 It is significant that, in contrast
to the Care Act 2014, the seven-year rule is inherently subject to a time limit under
the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 and the rules are in general certain and predictable.
Conclusion
This article has illustrated the risks of declarations of trusts and similar dispositions
designed to evade liability under the Care Act 2014, which are not remotely
guaranteed to succeed. While its anti-avoidance provisions are not unequivocally
the most onerous considered in this article, even people who plan well in advance
may have to rely on influential but not fully binding guidance, the inevitable
limitations on local authorities’ ability to discover dispositions and to establish
intention, or the benevolent exercise of discretion by local authorities to have their
arrangements for their dependants given effect. On the one hand, limitations on
contributions by the wealthy to the social care system may prejudice its ability to
provide care to those who genuinely cannot afford it.151 On the other, some of the
most organised and honest people who try to make provision for the genuinely
needy in the shadow of possible care fees may be most likely to be disadvantaged
by the Care Act’s anti-avoidance provisions, in the context of a stark but somewhat
arbitrary distinction between health and social care. Whatever one’s view of the
propriety of the system’s funding arrangements and the extent to which it should
be possible to avoid liability to pay for care, it would surely be preferable to have
clear rules on the matter written into the legislation, perhaps consistent with the
guidance’s rhetoric on the property rights of individuals.
Predicting matters such as the time of one’s death and the extent of one’s care
needs inevitably carries considerable difficulties. Inheritance tax liability can
nevertheless be incorporated into estate planning discussions because (for example)
the seven-year rule is relatively certain. The success of mechanisms to avoid
liability for care fees cannot, by contrast, be subject to comparatively safe
predictions.
150 IHTA 1984 ss.11, 19–22.
151 See, e.g. Sloan, “Adult social care and property rights” (2016) 36 O.J.L.S. (forthcoming).
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